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ABSTRACT
The “turnpike hypothesis” proposed in this article suggests that the trajectory 
of GDP growth rates is a “turnpike”, which attracts tax revenues of any type. 
A significant deviation of the rates of tax revenue growth from the turnpike means 
that this tax has grown unresponsive to the dynamics of the global tax base – GDP. 
To test this hypothesis, the authors introduce the indicators of surplus return and 
volatility of tax revenues, which leads them to narrowing the definitions of such 
terms as budget orientation and efficiency of taxes. To analyze the behaviour of 
economic agents, the authors construct econometric dependencies of three indirect 
taxes (VAT, customs duties and excise taxes) on the tax rate (tax burden), GDP 
and the population income. For the VAT, the tax burden was its nominal rate; for 
excise taxes, the share of excise taxes in the retail turnover; for customs duties, 
the share of customs duties in the foreign trade turnover. The resulting models 
were used to calculate the elasticity of tax revenues, GDP and population incomes 
with respect to the tax burden, which is equivalent to the analytical expression 
of the way the three participants of the economic system – state (public budget), 
producers (business) and consumers (population) – react to the tax burden. To 
analyze the analytical coefficients and econometric models, the authors used the 
statistical data of Rosstat for Russia and of the OECD for the USA for the period 
between 1995 and 2017. The calculations show that the Russian and American tax 
systems contain taxes that are “insensitive” to economic growth. In Russia, these 
include the natural resource extraction tax, customs duties and contributions to 
extra-budgetary funds, and in the USA, excise taxes, property tax and customs 
duties. The study shows that the Russian economic crises in 2008 and 2014 had a 
remedial effect on the country’s tax system and helped it get closer to the turnpike 
of economic growth. The model calculations of the three kinds of elasticity showed 
that an increase in the VAT tax rate reduced the activity of the three participants 
of the economic system while an increase in the excise or customs duty burden, 
on the contrary, enhanced their activity. The conclusion is made that the turnpike 
hypothesis is confirmed for the majority of taxes both in Russia and the USA. It is 
also shown that those taxes for which the hypothesis is confirmed only partially 
are in urgent need of reformation.
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АННОТАЦИЯ
В статье проверяется гипотеза названная авторами «магистральной». Соглас-
но данной «магистральной гипотезе» траектория темпов роста ВВП является 
своеобразной «магистралью» и обладает притягивающим свойством для лю-
бых видов налоговых доходов. Существенное отклонение темпов роста нало-
говых доходов от магистрали свидетельствует об отрыве налога от глобальной 
налоговой базы – ВВП. Для проверки гипотезы введены показатели избыточ-
ного дохода и волатильности налоговых доходов. Опираясь на введенные 
показатели и магистральную гипотезу, авторы дают строгое определение 
бюджет-ориентированности и эффективности налогов. Для исследования по-
ведения экономических субъектов построены эконометрические зависимости 
трех косвенных налогов (налог на добавленную стоимость, таможенные сборы 
и акцизы) от налоговой ставки (налогового бремени), ВВП и доходов населе-
ния. Для налога на добавленную стоимость в качестве налогового бремени 
использовалась его номинальная ставка, для акцизов – доля акцизных сборов 
в объеме розничной торговли, для таможенных платежей – доля таможенных 
сборов во внешнеторговом обороте. Построенные модели позволили рассчи-
тать эластичности налоговых доходов, ВВП и доходов населения по налогово-
му бремени, что эквивалентно аналитическому выражению реакции на нало-
говое бремя трех участников экономической системы: государства (бюджета), 
производителя (бизнеса) и потребителя (населения). Для оценки аналитиче-
ских коэффициентов и эконометрических моделей использовались статисти-
ческие данные Росстата для России и ОЭСР для США за период 1995–2017 гг. 
Расчеты показали, что и в России, и в США имеются налоги, крайне слабо 
реагирующие на экономический рост. Для России это налог на природные 
ресурсы, таможенные сборы и отчисления во внебюджетные фонды, а для 
США – акцизы, налог на собственность и таможенные сборы. Показано, что 
кризисные явления в российской экономике 2008 и 2014 гг. способствовали 
оздоровлению налоговой системы страны и ее приближению к магистрали 
экономического роста. Модельные расчеты трех видов эластичности показа-
ли, что рост ставки налога на добавленную стоимость снижал активность всех 
трех участников экономической системы, тогда как рост акцизного и тамо-
женного бремени оказывал на них, наоборот, стимулирующее действие. Сде-
лан вывод, что магистральная гипотеза выполняется для большинства нало-
гов, как в России, так и в США. Обоснован тезис, согласно которому налоги, 
для которых магистральная гипотеза выполняется в крайне слабой форме, 
нуждаются в первоочередном реформировании.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
налоговая реформа, государственные доходы, экономический рост, маги-
стральный принцип, экономическое поведение
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1. Introduction
Although fiscal systems in almost all 
countries of the world are relatively stable 
institutions, at times the need arises to re-
think and reform these systems. Such re-
forms can be more or less large scale but 
they always have a visible impact on all 
the participants of the economic system. 
Therefore, it is necessary to know the fo-
cus and intensity of their impact, which 
makes it crucial to be able to evaluate how 
the tax burden (tax rates) weighs on the 
tax base. In many cases this impact is hard 
to predict even on the qualitative level. 
For example, depending on the specific 
situation, an increase in a certain tax rate 
can be detrimental to economic activity or, 
on the contrary, enhance it. 
In this article we are going to consider 
an alternative way of evaluating the im-
pact of tax reforms on the economic activ-
ity of agents. In doing so, we are trying 
to address two interconnected tasks – to 
evaluate the correlation between the na-
tional tax system and GDP dynamics and 
to evaluate the impact of changing indi-
rect tax rates on the behaviour of various 
economic agents – the state, business and 
population. Indirect taxes were chosen as 
the most representative ones due to their 
close connection with the subject of taxa-
tion. The methodology proposed in this 
article, however, can be applied to direct 
taxation without any extra adjustments. 
The proposed approach relies on the idea 
that an efficient fiscal system should be 
characterized by more or less synchro-
nous changes in the rate of growth of fis-
cal revenues and economic growth. The 
temporal trajectories of the two types of 
indicators diverge considerably, which re-
veals the disparity of interests of the state, 
business and population and, therefore, 
the inefficiency of the current fiscal policy. 
Moreover, the divergence of trajectories 
can be considered as an important ele-
ment of macro-economic diagnostics.
2. Taxes and economic activity:  
review of research methods
Changes in budget revenues on dif-
ferent levels are shaped by the fiscal. For 
example, G. Miles points out that the po-
tential economic growth of any country is 
determined by the financial resources of 
the government (budget revenues) and 
the ways of obtaining and using these 
resources [1]. An increase in budget rev-
enues can affect the allocation of new 
state funds, enhance the growth in public 
spending, contribute to stabilization and 
intensification of economic activity and 
the country’s economic growth in general. 
There is a vast body of research lit-
erature analyzing the correlation between 
taxation and economic growth. Studies of 
the earlier period used regression models 
to analyze the impact that the changing 
tax revenues had on economic growth 
through public spending in different 
countries and periods. However, no firm 
conclusions were drawn about the nature 
and significance of this correlation. Some 
studies found no significant correlation 
between the changes in these indicators 
[2]; others found a negative correlation 
between the real GDP growth and public 
spending [3–5]. E. Engen and J. Skinner 
analyzed the panel data on 107 develop-
ing countries in 1970–1985 and found a 
negative correlation between the increas-
ing tax revenues and economic growth [6]. 
There is also evidence showing a negative 
correlation between the indicators due to 
an increase in the share of non-production 
expenses and a positive correlation due 
to an increase in state investment in the 
manufacturing sector [7]. 
Later research, however, has demon-
strated the opposite tendencies: for ex-
ample, J. Andrasic et al. built statistically 
significant dependencies, which showed 
that a 1% increase in tax revenues leads to 
a 0.29% increase in GDP [8]. The study of 
the relationship between a rise in tax rev-
enues and GDP in Nigeria in 1986–2012 
demonstrated a stable positive correla-
tion between these indicators [9]. These 
findings can hardly be called surprising 
since the size of the public sector has two 
opposite effects: on the one hand, higher 
tax rates can be detrimental to econom-
ic activity (Laffer curves), on the other 
hand, they can also stimulate economic 
activity by increasing public spending 
and investment.
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Yet another group of studies discussed 
the impact of taxes on economic growth 
by focusing on their level or structure (di-
rect vs. indirect). Although the majority of 
researchers are inclined to agree that the 
shift from direct taxation (income taxes) 
to indirect taxation (consumption taxes) 
enhances economic growth [10], the re-
sults acquired so far seem to be quite con-
tradictory: for instance, there is evidence 
showing that an increase in direct income 
taxes (personal income tax, property tax, 
profit tax and so on) has a negative im-
pact on economic growth [11; 12]. Y. Lee 
and R. Gordon analyzed 70 countries in 
the period of 1980–1997 and showed that 
a 10% reduction in the corporate tax rate 
leads to an increase in the per capita GDP 
by 0.7–1.1% [13]. Yet another study [14] 
demonstrated that a reduction in the per-
sonal income tax rate results in an increase 
in the per capita GDP by 1.4–1.8%. There 
is also evidence of the positive impact of 
indirect taxes on GDP growth [15; 16].
In [17], however, it is shown that a 
switch from direct to indirect taxation 
may have a negative influence on econom-
ic growth and exacerbate the economic 
downturn in EU countries. These findings 
are based on the results of the aggregative 
analysis of the EU states for the period of 
2000–2014. D.Stoilova and N.Patonov also 
point out the greater economic efficiency 
of direct taxation for EU countries [18]. 
J. F. Li and Z. X. Lin analyze the impact 
of the indirect sales tax on the economic 
growth in the USA in 1960–2013 and show 
that, despite certain short-term benefits, in 
the long run this tax has a negative cor-
relation with economic growth [19]. The 
negative impact of indirect taxes is also 
described in [8], showing that a 1% in-
crease in the goods and services tax rate 
leads to a 0.6% decrease in GDP.
There is also evidence [8; 20] that the 
application of the direct property tax is 
conducive to economic growth, although 
other studies [21] show that this tax has a 
neutral effect on economic growth.
The analysis of the correlation be-
tween taxation and economic growth in 
Nigeria in 1986–2000 [22] and 1993–2012 
[23] demonstrates that the oil tax revenues 
play a dominant role in the country’s eco-
nomic growth. In Malaysia, the tax struc-
ture is prevailed by direct taxes, in partic-
ular income taxes, while indirect taxation 
is less developed [24].
Russian researchers pay much atten-
tion to the correlation between taxation 
and economic growth. For example, it was 
found that the economic growth in Rus-
sia is mostly influenced by the oil prices 
dynamics (the correlation coefficient is 
0.7985) while the correlation between the 
real GDP and indirect taxes is 0.7937 [25]. 
The question about the positive or nega-
tive impact of indirect taxes (mostly VAT 
and excises) is directly connected to the 
problem of social justice and the social ef-
fects of taxation. While direct taxes actu-
ally reflect the paying capacity of taxpay-
ers and perform a distribution function 
in society, indirect taxes are regressive in 
nature and, as a rule, they impose a harsh-
er burden on poorer social groups [26]. 
It should be noted that this effect is to a 
greater extent characteristic of flat taxation 
while progressive taxation has a positive 
impact on economic growth [27]. On the 
other hand, an increase in specific indirect 
taxes, for example, excise duties on tobac-
co, can contribute to the improvement of 
public health and enhance state revenues. 
For instance, an increase in excise taxes in 
Indonesia by 57% led to a rise in state rev-
enues by 58% and to a reduction in tobac-
co use by 18% [28]. In Grenada, as a result 
of a 17% increase in tobacco excise rates, 
state revenues rose by 8.7% while tobacco 
consumption fell by 5% [29]. In general, 
simulation models show that in low- and 
medium-income countries, a 20% increase 
in excise taxes on average leads to a 14% 
rise in state revenues and a 5% drop in to-
bacco use [30].
Some researchers try to evaluate the 
outcomes of those tax reform projects that 
involve substantial adjustments of tax 
rates. For example, a three-factor model 
was applied for evaluating the scenarios 
of the personal income tax reform in Rus-
sia, including calculations of the expected 
impact on budget revenues and social in-
equality as well as the feasibility of each 
scenario [31]. The analytical scheme of 
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this type takes into account the reactions 
of different economic agents (state and 
population) to tax stimuli.
Summarizing our literature review, 
we can make the following conclusions.
First, at the moment there is no agree-
ment about the relationship between taxa-
tion and economic growth as it varies de-
pending on the time interval and country. 
Second, although researchers tend to 
consider the impact of tax revenues on 
economic growth, a considerable body of 
research focuses on the inverse relation-
ship [32; 33], treating economic growth 
as the main factor that determines the tax 
revenue [34].
Third, the analysis of the tax structure 
shows that indirect taxation is to a greater 
extent characteristic of developing coun-
tries and countries in transition [35] while 
in EU countries the share of indirect taxes 
dropped from two thirds to one third in 
the last hundred years [36]. There is evi-
dence that there is a close connection be-
tween the level of a country’s development 
and its tax structure [37], which means that 
less developed countries are more depen-
dent on foreign trade taxes while devel-
oped countries, on income taxes. Russia 
has also been experiencing the trend of the 
decreasing importance of indirect taxation: 
according to Rosstat, the share of indirect 
taxation was 30.1% in 2017 compared with 
38.7% in 2010. This trend is mostly caused 
by the falling revenues from foreign trade 
taxes, such as customs duties, due to the 
sanctions and increased tensions in inter-
national relations. Contrary to popular be-
lief in the “stability” of indirect taxes, this 
situation shows that indirect taxes are sub-
ject to external factors. 
In view of the above, our further anal-
ysis will go in two directions: first, we are 
going to evaluate the stability and reliabil-
ity of fiscal instruments by looking at their 
turnpike properties; second, we are going 
to analyze their impact on the Russian na-
tional economy. 
3. Analytical toolkit for the analysis 
of the turnpike properties of taxes
To study such properties of fiscal in-
struments as stability, reliability and ad-
equacy we can use a comparatively new 
concept of efficient fiscal policy described 
in [38–40]. This concept is underpinned 
by the idea that a tax system can function 
efficiently when reactions of taxpayers 
(production enterprises, businesses) and 
the state budget all but coincide. The dif-
ference in the reactions of the two above-
mentioned economic agents is estimated 
by looking at the difference in the values 
of the Laffer points of the first and second 
kind. The bigger is the distance between 
these points, the bigger is the clash of in-
terests of the state and business and the 
less efficient the fiscal system is. 
This principle is applicable to the 
problem of stability of tax revenues. In 
this case, we are going to specify our 
methodological assumptions the follow-
ing way: the dynamics of tax revenues should 
correspond to the dynamics of the tax base. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable that the 
dynamics of the tax base for the whole 
national economy can be approximated 
by the dynamics of GDP, which leads us 
to the following methodological assump-
tion: the rates of tax revenue growth should 
correspond to the rates of GDP growth. In 
this case, fiscal indicators and GDP will be 
expressed in current prices, which means 
that the inflation effect is present in both 
indicators and can be ignored when com-
paring them.
Hereinafter we are going to refer to 
this methodological principle as the turn-
pike principle or the turnpike hypothesis. 
Such terminology is also related to the 
fact that the GDP trajectory serves as the 
turnpike of economic development while 
the trajectories of all tax revenues should run 
parallel to this turnpike. The deviation de-
gree of the trajectory of tax revenues from 
the turnpike indirectly reflects how effi-
cient or inefficient the tax is and how sen-
sitive or insensitive is the fiscal system to 
the activity of economic entities. Although 
terminology used in this study is not di-
rectly connected to the turnpike theory 
of optimal paths in the models of John 
von Neumann, some analogy can still be 
drawn: for example, while Neumann’s 
models consider the optimal paths that 
parallel the turnpike or the von Neumann 
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ray, in our case we consider the fiscal tra-
jectories that run near the trajectory of eco-
nomic growth.
Thus, according to the turnpike prin-
ciple, all taxes should to a certain extent be 
connected to the economic activity of the 
system. The GDP growth rate is the most 
accurate measurement of economic activ-
ity. Even though the tax base is not directly 
related to GDP, the turnpike principle is 
still at work here. The only question in this 
respect is how significant the deviation 
from this principle should be to remain 
acceptable. This assumption correlates 
with the findings of M. Mishustin, who 
analyzed the factors of tax revenue growth 
and showed that regardless of the specific 
factors that affected tax revenues, the latter 
were still determined by the general geo-
economic situation in the country [41].
Thus, the turnpike principle enables 
us to build a simple analytical scheme to 
analyze the turnpike properties of tax rev-
enues. To this end, let us introduce four 
simple indicators:
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where λt and μt are the rate of GDP growth 
and the i-th tax revenue in the t-th year 
respectively; T is the length of the retro-
spective dataset; l is the mean value of 
the absolute surplus revenue from the i-th 
fiscal instrument; RI is the mean value of 
the relative surplus revenue from the i-th 
fiscal instrument; and V is the volatility of 
the i-th tax revenue. 
If RI > 0, then the trajectory of tax rev-
enues lies above the trajectory of economic 
growth and there is a surplus tax revenue; 
if RI < 0, then the fiscal trajectory lies be-
low the trajectory of economic growth and 
in this case we are dealing with the loss of 
revenue.
The indicator we introduced (4) al-
lows us to classify fiscal instruments ac-
cording to two turnpike qualities – budget 
orientation and efficiency. A fiscal instru-
ment is considered budget-oriented if it pro-
vides positive values of surplus revenue, 
that is, RI > 0; otherwise, a fiscal instru-
ment is called liberal. In other words, the 
rates of growth of a budget-oriented tax 
exceed those of economic growth. Efficient 
fiscal instruments are characterized by in-
significant values of the surplus revenue; 
otherwise, we shall deem them inefficient. 
To specify this criterion, we shall assume 
that the value is insignificant if |RI| = 5%. 
Thus, a tax is considered efficient if it is 
closely associated with the dynamics of 
economic growth.
In addition to the classification de-
scribed above, we can also formulate two 
criteria of severe inefficiency. The first cri-
terion is that a tax is considered extremely 
ineffecient if the following condition is ful-
filled: |RI| > 20%. The second criterion is 
that a tax is considered extremely ineffi-
cient if the following strong or weak con-
dition is fulfilled: |RI| > V or |RI| ≈ V; 
this criterion is auxiliary. These criteria are 
purely empirical but they can still be use-
ful for conclusive diagnostics of the fiscal 
instruments and their efficiency. 
It should be noted that efficiency of a 
fiscal instrument can be also understood 
as a manifestation of social justice. For 
example, if an increase in the tax rate sig-
nificantly exceeds the growth of the tax 
base, it is a sign of some ill-considered 
governmental decision-making in the fis-
cal sphere, for example, when the govern-
ment increases the tax burden on econom-
ic agents without taking into account the 
actual situation. Otherwise we are dealing 
with another kind of injustice, when eco-
nomic agents are underpaying taxes and 
the state budget receives less than due.
These concepts are sufficient for our 
research of the turnpike properties of the 
current taxes. They also enable us to iden-
tify the significant setbacks of the Russian 
national tax system. Hereinafter we are 
going to refer to these analytical indicators 
as turnpike parameters. The properties of 
the tax system to be studied by applying 
these parameters will be referred to as 
turnpike properties. 
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4. Turnpike properties of fiscal 
instruments: the case of Russia
To test the methodology described 
above, we used the annual data provided 
by the Rosstat for 1995–2018. To calculate 
the aggregate data on tax revenues and 
GDP, we used the current prices. The fis-
cal instruments we are going to consider 
include ten types of fiscal revenues. Direct 
taxes include the income tax (IT); personal 
income tax (PIT); property tax (PT); and 
natural resource extraction tax (NRT). In-
direct taxes include the value-added tax 
or VAT; excise taxes (ET); customs duties1 
(CD); extrabudgetary payments or contri-
butions to the pension fund (PC); health 
insurance fund (HIC); and the social se-
curity fund (SSC). In our calculations we 
took into account the functional character-
istics of the fiscal instruments. The results 
are shown in the table below.
Table 1 
Turnpike parameters 
of the Russian tax system
Fiscal instrument Turnpike 
parameters
RI, % V, %
Direct taxes
Income tax –0.7 17.8
Personal income tax, PIT 7.7 8.6
Property Tax, PT 6.4 17.5
Natural Resource Tax, NRT 42.4 26.4
Indirect taxes
Value-added tax, VAT –1.3 9.5
Excise taxes, ET 5.3 18.0
Customs duties, CD 33.7 35.4
Extra-budgetary contributions
Pension Contribution, PC –24,8 14.8
Health Insurance 
Contributions, HIC 
58.6 45.2
Social Security Contributions, 
SSC 
–56.5 12.6
Source: Calculated by the authors according 
to formulae (1)–(4) by using the Rosstat data.
This quantitative evaluation allows 
us to draw the following matrix to clas-
sify the fiscal instruments (see Table 2, the 
extremely inefficient fiscal instruments are 
shown in italics).
1 In Russian statistics, customs duties and 
levies as well as other revenues from foreign 
trade constitute one group of revenues – these 
data are then used for further calculations.
Table 2
Classification of fiscal instruments 
in Russia
Liberality  
criterion
Efficiency criterion
Efficient Inefficient
Budget-oriented – ET, PT, PIT, 
CD, NRT, HIC
Liberal IT, VAT PC, SSC
Let us now consider these results in 
more detail.
First, there are no fundamental func-
tional differences between direct and 
indirect taxes if we apply this approach. 
For both types of taxes we can distinguish 
between “efficient/liberal” and “ineffi-
cient/budget-oriented”. Therefore, from 
the point of view of their turnpike proper-
ties, direct and indirect taxes are virtually 
equal and neither of the two types is more 
preferable than the other. 
Second, one of the four groups of taxes 
shown in Table 2 and containing the most 
productive instruments is empty, which 
means that at the moment the Russian Min-
istry of Finance does not have truly efficient 
instruments for replenishing the state bud-
get. In fact, Russian regulators constantly 
have to choose between the liberality and 
efficiency of a fiscal instrument.
Third, Russian tax regulators usually 
give preference to the budget orientation 
of taxes rather than their efficiency, which 
means that they use 20% of the available 
efficient instruments, and 60%, of the bud-
get-oriented instruments. 
Fourth, the Russian taxation system 
is characterized by an obvious anomaly 
consisting in two inefficient and liberal 
payments to extra-budgetary funds. The 
fact that this structural element accounts 
for 20% of the given fiscal instruments is 
alarming.
Fifth, the Russian tax system has al-
ready accumulated an extremely large 
number of inefficient instruments. For ex-
ample, the share of inefficient instruments 
in the set we analyzed is 50%, which is a 
significant figure. All five instruments of 
this group – the CD, NRT, HIC, PC and the 
SSC – prove to be extremely unproductive 
according to both criteria. Furthermore, 
they are characterized by extremely high 
Journal of Tax Reform. 2019;5(2):129–147
136
ISSN 2412-8872
values of the indicator |RI|, which means 
that there is a high level of distortions in 
the adjustment of the fiscal system to meet 
the country’s actual economic needs. In 
fact, Russia has several fiscal instruments 
that are unrelated to the economic activity 
of the system: CD, NRT and extra-budget-
ary funds.
Extra-budgetary funds are particu-
larly important in this respect since they 
reveal the specific characteristics of the 
Russian tax regulation system oriented 
towards the “non-economic” ways of re-
plenishing the state budget – through and 
customs duties. In other words, extra-
budgetary funds are no longer connected 
to the dynamics of economic growth. 
In order to understand the drawbacks 
of the Russian tax system, we need to look 
at the trajectories of the three groups of fis-
cal instruments and put them in the con-
text of the country’s economic growth (in 
current prices). Let us look at the follow-
ing figures.
These diagrams point to the fact that, 
despite significant deviations of the Rus-
sian tax system from the turnpike – GDP – 
there tend to be less deviations from the 
turnpike properties. For example, there 
were two distinct stages in the develop-
ment of the tax system – before and after 
the 2008 crisis, both for direct (Figure 1) and 
indirect (Figure 2) taxes. Before 2008 there 
were considerable discrepancies between 
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Figure 1. Trajectories of the rates of growth of direct tax revenues in Russia
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Figure 2. Trajectories of the rates of growth of indirect tax revenues in Russia
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GDP growth and tax revenues, while after 
2008 they tended to synchronize. A similar 
trend was observed in relation to extra-
budgetary funds, although after 2008 the 
health insurance funds continued to un-
dergo some serious transformations (Fig-
ure 3). The tax reforms of 2005–2006 and 
2011–2012 disrupted the process of stabi-
lization of extra-budgetary revenues. In 
general, crises in Russian economy seem to 
have invigorated the country’s fiscal sys-
tem by improving its turnpike properties.
5. Turnpike properties of fiscal 
instruments: the case of the USA
In order to gain a better understand-
ing of the turnpike properties of tax sys-
tems, let us compare the tax systems of 
Russia and the USA. First, we are going 
to calculate the turnpike parameters of 
the seven taxes applied in the USA for the 
period from 1995 to 2017. The set of fiscal 
instruments applied in the USA does not 
fully coincide with its Russian counterpart 
but some analogies can still be drawn. We 
are going to consider the following instru-
ments: the individual income tax (IIT); 
property tax (PT); corporate profits tax 
(TPC); sales tax (ST); excise taxes (ET); 
customs import duties (CID); and social 
security contributions (SSC).
In our calculations we used the sta-
tistical data provided by the OECD (see 
Table 3). 
Table 3
Turnpike parameters 
of the US tax system 
Fiscal instrument Turnpike 
parameters
RI, % V, %
Direct taxes
Corporate profits tax, TPC 4.8 14.0
Individual income tax, IIT 11.6 6.0
Property tax, PT 31.2 3.7
Indirect taxes
Sales tax, ST –9.3 1.2
Excise taxes, ET –74,5 2.7
Customs import duties, CID –28,6 5.1
Extra-budgetary contributions
Social security contributions, 
SSC
–6.5 1.8
Source: Calculated by the authors according 
to formulae (1)–(4) by using the OECD data.
The results of our calculations lead us 
to the following conclusions.
First, the turnpike properties of the 
Russian tax system are generally weaker 
than those of the USA. For example, the 
absolute mean value of indicator RI of the 
tax portfolio in Table 1 is 23.7% while in 
the USA the similar indicator for the tax 
portfolio in Table 2 is 25.2%, that is, there 
is a certain parity in the ways both tax sys-
tems are adjusted to react to the dynamics 
of economic growth. The average volatil-
ity (V), however, is 20.6% for Russia and 
4.9% for the USA, which means that the 
fluctuations of tax revenues about the 
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Figure 3. Trajectories of the rates of growth of extra-budgetary expenses in Russia
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turnpike in Russia is more than five times 
higher than in the USA.
Second, there is a consistent pattern 
in the way the turnpike parameters are 
formed in the USA, while in Russia there 
is no such pattern. For example, indicator 
RI in the USA takes positive values for di-
rect taxes and negative for indirect taxes 
on a regular basis, which confirms the 
above-mentioned idea that in developed 
countries direct taxation is preferred to 
indirect taxation [34]. It should be noted 
that the USA have broken a local record 
for indicator RI for excise taxes. This fact 
means that in the recent decades the US 
state policy has been aimed towards re-
ducing the burden of indirect taxation and 
prioritizing direct taxation.
Third, the tax systems of both coun-
tries have taxes which are “insensitive” to 
the economic growth: in Russia, it is the 
natural resource extraction tax and cus-
toms duties while in the USA these are the 
excise taxes and customs duties. This situ-
ation is hardly surprising since these tax-
es directly depend not only on economic 
growth but on other kinds of state policy 
as well. For example, payments for using 
natural resources are determined primar-
ily by the current economic and environ-
mental situation, excise tax payments – by 
social imperatives such as the public health 
imperative and the customs revenues, by 
global trends in the sphere of foreign trade 
liberalization and trade wars.
This leads us to an important conclu-
sion that the initial priorities in differ-
ent kinds of state policy can significantly 
mitigate the turnpike property of the tax 
system, which can be considered as natu-
ral. In fact, any serious reforms distort the 
turnpike effects of national taxes. 
Table 4
Classification of fiscal instruments 
in the USA
Liberality 
criterion
Efficiency criterion
Efficient Inefficient
Budget-oriented TPC IIT; PT
Liberal – ST; SSC; ET; CID
Our classification of the taxes in the 
USA (see Table 4) shows that few fiscal 
instruments can be considered efficient, 
which is true not only for the Russian but 
also American economy. According to the 
available data, the only tax that qualifies as 
efficient/budget-oriented is the corporate 
profit tax. This conclusion correlates with 
the results of B.Kalas et al., who showed 
that in the USA, the TPC is one of the key 
taxes affecting economic growth [42]. This 
study also provided evidence that taxes 
like the IIT do not influence significantly 
the country’s economic growth. In this re-
spect, the ITT is even less important than 
the SSC, whose share in the US tax struc-
ture is considerably smaller. 
Similarly, American taxes can be bud-
get-oriented, but this quality is not uni-
versal. Thus, tax systems of any countries 
face a number of problems while trying 
to maintain a close relationship with eco-
nomic growth.
6. The VAT reform and its impact 
on the national economy
The main focus of tax reforms tends to 
be the changes in the tax burden, in par-
ticular, various tax rates. In practice, how-
ever, what matters is how the tax reform 
affects the behaviour of the economic sys-
tem and its three core components – the 
budget (state), producers (business) and 
consumers (population). As it will be dis-
cussed below, in certain cases this task has 
an analytical and numerical solution. 
The general approach to this task is to 
assume that the budget system has a turn-
pike property, which can manifest itself to 
a greater or lesser degree. This assumption 
can be further specified by constructing 
econometric dependencies of tax revenues 
on tax rates and tax base. For the latter, we 
use different statistical aggregates. If the 
turnpike property of budget and extra-
budgetary revenues manifests itself clear-
ly enough, the above-mentioned econo-
metric dependencies can be constructed, 
which allows us to measure the impact 
of tax reforms on the national economy. 
Otherwise, such dependencies cannot be 
constructed, which, in turn, will make 
it difficult to evaluate the effect of these 
reforms. We are going to consider three 
types of elasticity at a given tax rate – the 
tax revenues and tax base of physical and 
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legal entities – as a set of tools used by a 
tax reform to affect the economy.
For a more accurate picture let us con-
sider the current indirect taxes in Russia, 
starting with the value-added tax (VAT). 
To reveal the connection between the 
budget revenues from the VAT and the 
VAT rate we are going to build an econo-
metric model for the interval between 
1995 and 2018 based on the Rosstat data 
(Table 5) in the multiplicative form:
= β + α ⋅ ,VATT GDP  (5)
where α and β are the parameters of the 
model.
In its final form, this econometric 
model looks the following way:
= ⋅+
(2.393) 6.846( )
35.092 0.231( ),VATT q GDP
    (6)
N = 22; R2 = 0.70; DW = 2.00; A = 8,76%,
where TVAT is the annual VAT revenue 
deflated by the deflator; q is the nominal 
VAT rate, which, until the end of 2003, was 
20% and in 2004 was reduced to 18%; GDP 
is the annual GDP deflated by the defla-
tor. The t-statistics are given in parenthe-
ses below the regression coefficients; A is 
an approximation error (in percentage); 
the rest of the nomenclature is standard.
All the statistical characteristics of 
model (6) are satisfactory, which means 
that it can be used for further calcula-
tions. We decided to use aggregates ex-
pressed in comparable prices because 
the current prices contain an inflation 
component, which, when we are dealing 
with large values, creates unnecessary in-
formation noise and makes it difficult to 
establish the statistical relations between 
the variables. In Russia, the inflation 
noise in the given interval was so signifi-
cant that it prevented us from building 
an econometric dependency, which is 
why we used the deflation procedure. As 
for the multiplicative form of model (6), 
it should be said that it is quite natural, 
especially if we take into consideration 
that fiscal revenues are formed through 
Table 5
Initial data for building models (6) and (8)
 Years GDP, 
bln rbs
(current prices)
TVAT, 
bln rbs
(current prices)
INC, 
bln rbs  
(current prices)
Deflator (against 
the previous year), 
%
VAT rate (q)
1996 2007.8 143.9 1357.1 145.8 0.20
1997 2342.5 182.8 1656.4 115.1 0.20
1998 2629.6 170.3 1776.0 118.6 0.20
1999 4823.2 288.2 2908.1 172.5 0.20
2000 7305.6 457.3 3983.9 137.6 0.20
2001 8943.6 639.0 5325.8 116.5 0.20
2002 10830.5 752.7 6831.0 115.6 0.20
2003 13208.2 882.1 8900.5 113.8 0.20
2004 17027.2 1069.7 10930.0 120.3 0.18
2005 21609.8 1472.3 13819.0 119.3 0.18
2006 26917.2 1511.1 17290.1 115.2 0.18
2007 33247.5 2261.7 21311.5 113.8 0.18
2008 41276.8 2132.5 25244.0 118.0 0.18
2009 38807.2 2050.3 28708.4 102.0 0.18
2010 46308.5 2498.6 32498.0 114.2 0.18
2011 60282.5 3250.8 35649.0 115.9 0.18
2012 68163.9 3546.1 39904.0 109.1 0.18
2013 73133.9 3539.4 44650.0 105.4 0.18
2014 79058.5 3940.2 47919.0 107.5 0.18
2015 83094.3 4233.9 53526.0 107.6 0.18
2016 86014.2 4571.4 54117.0 103.2 0.18
2017 92101.3 5137.6 55368.0 105.4 0.18
2018 103875.8 6017.0 n/a 110.3 0.18
Source: Rosstat.
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multiplication of the tax rate and the tax 
base. In this case, we use GDP as the gen-
eral aggregate, which serves as a proxy 
variable for the tax base of the national 
producer. It should be noted that our at-
tempts to build a model in the additive 
form with a linear division of the effects 
of the tax rate and the tax base failed to 
yield any positive results.
Our goal is to identify the impact of 
VAT liberalization (a one-time reduction 
in the tax rate by 2 percentage points) on 
the budget and producers, that is, on state 
and business revenues. This impact can 
be measured with the help of standard 
elasticity indicators such as the elasticity 
of the VAT revenue at the rate of VAT 
(EVAT) and the GDP elasticity at the rate 
of VAT (EGDP). It is not hard to find the 
elasticity of the tax revenue, which can be 
calculated in the discrete form as a mean 
value for the whole period of research 
EVAT ≈ (∆T/T)/∆q/q). Taking into account 
the form of this relationship (5) and the 
fact that a change in the tax rate influences 
not only the state revenue (TVAT(q)) but 
also GDP (GDP(q)), we can write the fol-
lowing expansion for the elasticity of tax 
revenues: 
= − β +(1 / )(1 ).VAT VAT GDPE T E     (7)
If we know the value of elasticity EVAT, 
we can use equation (7) to get the value of 
elasticity EGDP.
The results of our calculations of the 
effect the VAT has on the state and busi-
ness are shown in Table 6. In our calcula-
tions, we used the mean value of TVAT for 
the given period. 
Table 6
Reaction of Russian economic agents 
to the VAT reform
Economic 
agent
Activity index Elas-
ticity 
para-
meter
Elas-
ticity 
value
State Tax revenue EVAT –0.33
Business Production output EGDP –1.45
Population Monetary income EINC –1.47
To show the correlation between the 
VAT revenue, tax parameters and con-
sumer behaviour, we shall rely on the 
initial data shown in Table 1 and build 
an econometric model for the interval 
1995–2017 by using the Rosstat data in 
the previously applied multiplicative 
form:
= ⋅+
(3.165) (7.478)
38.931 0.346( ),VATT q INC      (8)
N = 22; R2 = 0.73; DW = 1.65; A = 7.24%,
where INC is the annual population in-
come deflated by the deflator while all the 
other nomenclature remains the same.
Similar to model (6), where GDP is 
used as a proxy variable for the reaction 
of producers (business) to the changing 
tax burden, in model (8) we use the INC 
as a proxy variable for the reaction of con-
sumers (population). It is quite obvious 
that the dependence of the VAT on con-
sumers’ income is almost the same as the 
dependence of the VAT on producers’ in-
come. The results of our calculations of the 
population’s income elasticity at the rate 
of VAT EINC according to formula (7) are 
shown in Table 6. 
Our results concerning the reactions 
of the three economic agents are quite 
predictable. As our calculations show, 
businesses and consumers reacted to an 
increase in the VAT rate in virtually the 
same way – by becoming less active. The 
reaction of the state also falls within the 
depressed scenario but to a lesser degree 
than for business enterprises and the pop-
ulation. This observation can be interpret-
ed the following way: an increase in rate q 
leads to a considerable reduction in the tax 
base, which cannot be compensated by an 
increase in this rate and results in a fall in 
state tax revenues.
The values of the elasticities can be 
used to evaluate the rates of growth of the 
three aggregates – VAT revenues (μVAT), 
GDP volume (λGDP) and the population in-
come (λINC) – resulting from the changes in 
tax rate q. To this end, let us use formula 
μVAT = EVAT(∆q/q) and its equivalents for 
other characteristics related to rates. We 
can calculate the effect of the VAT reduc-
tion by 2 percentage points in 2004 and the 
effect of its reverse increase by 2 percent-
age points in 2019. It is worth pointing out 
that there is a small asymmetry in the re-
sults of calculations due to the changing 
standard tax rate (Table 7). 
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Table 7
Effect of the VAT reform in Russia, %
Economic 
agent
Activity 
index
Reform scenario
Reduced 
tax rate  
(–2 per-
centage 
points)
Increased 
tax rate
(+2 per-
centage 
points)
State μVAT 0.03 –0.04
Business λGDP 0.15 –0.16
Population λINC 0.15 –0.16
These results can be explained by 
the fact that the growth rates of GDP and 
population income are more than modest. 
We should also take into account the fact 
that a certain instantaneous potential ef-
fect is implied when we calculate the cor-
responding effect. For example, potential 
GDP growth in 2004, when the VAT rate 
was reduced, was 0.15%. In all likelihood, 
however, this effect was not realized with-
in one year but took longer. We suppose 
that it reached its peak the second or the 
third year after the tax reform and that af-
terwards it faded gradually. For example, 
if we suppose that the impact of the tax 
reform will be evenly distributed through-
out the following fifteen years, it will be 
vanishingly small – just 0.01% a year. 
Thus, the stimulus it gives to the Russian 
economy as a result from the reduced 
VAT rate would not make a big difference. 
Similarly, a rise in the VAT rate in 2019 is 
likely to have only a weak recessive effect 
which takes time to manifest itself.
It should be noted that in accordance 
with formula (7), as the tax revenues 
grow, the elasticity of GDP and popula-
tion income decrease proportionally. For 
example, in 2004, when the new VAT rate 
was introduced, elasticity EGDP was 1.46 
and in 2018, 1.41, which means that the ef-
fect of the tax reform tends to decrease in 
the course of time. 
7. Customs duty burden and its impact 
on the national economy
Apart from the VAT reform, there 
have also been significant changes to the 
system of customs duties. In order to eval-
uate the impact of these changes, we can 
use the same analytical scheme described 
in the previous section with some minor 
adjustments. 
The peculiarity of customs duties is 
that this fiscal instrument does not have 
a single rate but instead includes a large 
number of percentage rates applied for 
various imported and exported goods. 
Therefore, first we need to obtain some 
kind of generalized measure of the cus-
toms duty burden. Let us assume that the 
tax base for the CD is the foreign trade 
turnover TT (export and import). Then, if 
we convert this statistical aggregate into 
the national currency by using the aver-
age annual exchange rate k, we can cal-
culate the average customs duty burden 
q as a ratio of customs duties TCD (foreign 
trade revenues) to the trade turnover: 
q = TCD/k · TT.
As in the previous section, in this 
section we are going to assume that the 
formation of revenues TCD is determined 
by the two factors – tax burden q and eco-
nomic activity measured through GDP. 
We shall try to build the desired depen-
dency in an additive form:
= α + β + γ ⋅ ,CDT q GDP  (9)
where α, β and γ are the parameters of the 
model.
The peculiar feature of model (9) is 
that it clearly distinguishes the effects of 
the tax base and tax burden. It should be 
noted that since we failed to construct a 
satisfactory econometric dependence in a 
multiplicative form, we have decided to 
use an additive model instead (9). 
As a result of our computational ex-
periments based on the data in Table 8, we 
have obtained the following econometric 
model for customs duties:
+ ⋅= − +⋅
(7.719) (19.491) 6( .357)
64.559 970.917 0.031 ,CDT q GDP
 
N = 23; R2 = 0.97; DW = 1.93; A = 8,8%.
Characteristics of model (10) are sat-
isfactory, which makes it suitable for use 
in other analytical calculations. Therefore, 
as before, we are going to calculate the 
elasticity of customs duties by using cus-
toms duty burden ECD in the discrete form 
(Table 9). Taking into account the form 
of this relationship (9), the expression of 
elasticity of GDP will be as follows:
(10)
Journal of Tax Reform. 2019;5(2):129–147
142
ISSN 2412-8872
− β
=
γ ⋅
/
.
/
CD CD
GDP
CD
E q TE
GDP T  
(11)
To estimate the population’s reac-
tion, we apply the following econometric 
model:
+ ⋅= − +
+ ⋅
6.079 (16.984)
(4.7
(
9 )
)
1
65.879 994.543
0.044 ,
CDT q
INC
    
(12)
N = 23; R2 = 0.97; DW = 2.04; A = 11.2%.
The results of our calculations accord-
ing to formula (11) are shown in Table 9. 
As this table illustrates, the functional 
characteristics of the CD and the VAT as 
fiscal tools are completely opposite. While 
for the VAT all elasticities in Table 6 are 
negative, for the CD in Table 9 they are 
positive. The latter means that an increase 
in the customs duty burden does not curb 
economic activity, as we might have ex-
pected, but, on the contrary, enhances it 
for producers and consumers. This anom-
alous effect raises some questions but it is 
congruent with our calculations from the 
previous sections, which showed that the 
turnpike property of the CD is extremely 
weak and that they are to a great extent 
autonomous from economic growth. 
Thus, when the customs duty burden in-
creases, producers and consumers try to 
compensate for their losses by becoming 
more active.
Table 9
Reaction of Russian economic agents 
to changes in the CD
Economic 
agent
Activity 
index
Elasticity 
param-
eter
Elas-
ticity 
value
State Tax revenue ECD 1.53
Business Production 
output
EGDP 0.93
Population Monetary 
income
EINC 0.99
In order to measure the customs duty 
burden, we need to take into account the 
fact that it changes constantly and unpre-
dictably, that is, annually, unlike the VAT 
Table 8
Initial data for building models (10) and (12)
 Years TCD,
bln rbs
Export,  
mln dollars
Import,  
mln dollars
Exchange 
rate k
Customs 
burden q
1995 48.3 78 217 46 709 4.559 0.085
1996 39.7 85 189 46 458 5.218 0.058
1997 38.8 85 096 53 123 5.786 0.049
1998 53.1 71 314 43 579 9.700 0.048
1999 122.6 72 885 30 278 24.620 0.048
2000 266.6 103,093 33 880 28.140 0.069
2001 846.8 99 969 41 883 29.170 0.205
2002 388.8 106,712 46 177 31.350 0.081
2003 505.7 133,656 57 347 30.688 0.086
2004 898.2 181,600 75 569 28.815 0.121
2005 1680.9 241,473 98 708 28.286 0.175
2006 2306.3 301,244 137,807 27.185 0.193
2007 2408.3 351,928 199,753 25.577 0.171
2008 3584.9 467,581 267,101 24.855 0.196
2009 2683.3 301,667 167,348 31.723 0.180
2010 3227.7 397,068 228,912 30.369 0.170
2011 4664.4 516,718 305,760 29.387 0.193
2012 4962.7 524,735 317,263 31.093 0.190
2013 5011.0 525,976 315,298 31.848 0.187
2014 5463.7 497,359 287,063 38.422 0.181
2015 3295.3 343,512 182,902 60.958 0.103
2016 2606.0 285,652 182,448 67.035 0.083
2017 2602.8 357,767 227,464 58.353 0.076
Source: Rosstat.
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burden, which changed once in a discrete 
and unidirectional way. Therefore, our re-
sults do not show any comprehensive ef-
fect of the customs policy on the Russian 
economy. In other words, since the cus-
toms duty burden constantly fluctuates, 
its changes fail to have a comprehensive 
effect. For instance, in the given period the 
range of its fluctuations was 5.8–20.5%. The 
customs duty burden tended to increase 
from 2001 to 2014. In 2015, there was a 
reversal of this trend probably due to the 
international sanctions imposed on Russia.
To estimate the effect caused by the 
shifts in the customs duty burden, let us 
consider the period from 2015 to 2016, 
when the burden decreased by 2 percent-
age points. Our calculations of the macro-
economic indicators characterizing the 
reactions of the state, business and popu-
lation are shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Effect of the CD tax changes  
in 2015–2016, %
Economic 
agent
Activity 
index
Reduced rate of q
(–2 percentage points)
State μVAT –0.29
Business λGDP –0.18
Population λINC –0.19
If we compare the data in Table 7 
and 10, we shall see that the impact of the 
VAT and CD on business and the popula-
tion expressed in absolute values is com-
parable while their impact on the state 
budget differs significantly, which can be 
explained by the already established fact 
that the VAT is characterized by a strong 
turnpike property while for the CD this 
property is extremely weak.
8. Excise burden and its impact  
on the national economy
Excise taxes (ET) are an important kind 
of indirect taxes in Russia. The excise bur-
den in the given period changed consider-
ably. Like customs revenues, excise taxes 
do not have a single rate but instead their 
rates are expressed as an amount per unit 
of goods or as an amount per unit of goods 
and a percentage of the retail price. There-
fore, we are going to estimate the excise 
burden the same way as we did it with the 
customs burden: we are going to calculate 
the mean rate of excise taxes q as a share of 
excise revenues TET from the volume of the 
retail turnover RET, that is, q = TET/RET. 
The rest of the methodology will remain 
the same as in the case of customs duties. 
The initial data for constructing 
econometric models are provided by Ros-
stat and are shown in Table 11. It is easy 
to see that the mean rate of excise taxes 
varied within the range from 2.5 to 7.8% 
of the volume of retail trade, which serves 
as a proxy variable of the excise tax base.
Table 11
Initial data for building models (13) 
and (14)
 Years Excise duties, 
bln rbs
(current 
prices)
Retail turn-
over, bln rbs
(current 
prices)
Rate
1995 24.0 512.0 0.047
1996 53.4 728.9 0.073
1997 68.1 852.9 0.080
1998 72.2 1042.8 0.069
1999 109.1 1797.4 0.061
2000 166.4 2352.3 0.071
2001 243.3 3070.0 0.079
2002 264.1 3765.4 0.070
2003 347.8 4529.6 0.077
2004 246.9 5642.5 0.044
2005 253.7 7041.5 0.036
2006 270.6 8711.9 0.031
2007 314.4 10869.0 0.029
2008 350.0 13944.2 0.025
2009 347.2 14599.2 0.024
2010 471.5 16512.0 0.029
2011 650.5 19104.3 0.034
2012 837.0 21394.5 0.039
2013 1015.9 23685.9 0.043
2014 1072.2 26356.2 0.041
2015 1068.4 27526.8 0.039
2016 1356.0 28240.9 0.048
2017 1599.5 29745.5 0.054
2018 1589.5 31579.4 0.050
Source: Rosstat.
As a result of our computational ex-
periments, we have built the following 
econometric dependencies:
+ ⋅
⋅
= − +
+
(10.016) (23.441)
(17.509)
29.419 649.830
0.014 ,
ETT q
GDP
    
(13)
N = 24; R2 = 0,96; DW = 1,61; A = 4,4%.
Journal of Tax Reform. 2019;5(2):129–147
144
ISSN 2412-8872
= − +
+
+ ⋅
⋅
(7.486) (16.989)
(12.088)
33.749 687.155
0.024 ,
ETT q
INC
    
(14)
N = 23; R2 = 0,94; DW = 1,35; A = 5,5%.
The models we built have enabled 
us to identify the parameters of the reac-
tion of the state, business and population 
to changes in the average excise burden 
(Table 12) and the correlation between 
the rates of growth of the corresponding 
variables and the changes in the average 
excise rate, for instance, by 2 percentage 
points (Table 13).
Table 12
Reaction of Russian economic agents 
to ET changes
Economic 
agent
Activity 
index
Elasticity 
parameter
Elas-
ticity 
value
State Tax revenue EET 2.12
Business Production 
output
EGDP 1.33
Population Monetary 
income
EINC 1.18
Table 13
Effects of the changes  
in the ET burden, %
Economic 
agent
Activity 
index
Reduced rate of q
(–2 percentage points)
State μET 0.85
Business λGDP 0.53
Population λINC 0.47
We can see that the changes in the ex-
cises and customs duties have a stimulat-
ing effect on business and the population. 
Apparently, in both cases the economic 
agents are trying to compensate for their 
losses by increasing their activity. What 
is interesting is that the three groups of 
economic agents are much more sensitive 
towards the average excise burden than 
that of the VAT or CD. For example, for 
business the GDP growth rate resulting 
from the 2-percentage points change in 
excise taxes is three times higher than if 
we change the VAT or customs duty bur-
den in a similar way. Such effects can be 
explained by the much bigger “weight” of 
each percentage point in the rate for the 
ET in comparison with the VAT and CD.
Interestingly, all the three elastici-
ties are positive for the ET, their sign is 
the same as the CD but different from 
the VAT. This corresponds to the previ-
ously established turnpike property for 
the three taxes: RIVAT < 0, RIET > 0, RICD > 0 
(Table 1). Thus, in our analysis the turn-
pike effects of taxes are comprehensive in 
the sense that they manifest themselves in 
different aspects depending on the given 
functional property.
9. Conclusion
The turnpike hypothesis discussed 
in this paper has led us to the conclusion 
that in fiscal systems of different countries 
there always are certain fiscal instruments 
that are “insensitive” to economic growth. 
Such instruments perform a purely fiscal 
function and depend primarily on politi-
cal imperatives. Nevertheless, even these 
“insensitive” fiscal instruments respond 
to the dynamics of economic growth and 
the reaction of national producers. Our cal-
culations show that not only are “insensi-
tive” taxes characterized by an extremely 
weak turnpike property but the popula-
tion and business also prove to be insensi-
tive to changes in the rates of these taxes.
“Insensitive” taxes are detrimental to 
the efficiency of the tax system and their 
share in the tax system should be mini-
mized. Therefore, the detection of such 
“insensitive” taxes will help us tackle the 
problem of their restructurization and 
thus balance the interests of different eco-
nomic agents.
The quantitative evaluation of the re-
actions of the state budget, business and 
population to tax reforms given in this 
article can be used as a preparatory step 
in the decision-making process. In order 
to elaborate a more detailed model of a 
tax reform we need to improve the accu-
racy of our macro-economic evaluations 
by taking into account the effects of com-
pensation and substitution. For example, 
an increase in excises on expensive goods 
can reduce their consumption and stimu-
late the consumption of other groups of 
goods. In a similar way customs barriers 
to certain groups of goods may lead to an 
increase in the turnover of other goods. 
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However, a detailed analysis of these ef-
fects falls outside the scope of this paper.
Another issue to be discussed is re-
lated to the universality of the turnpike 
principle. For example, if we assume that 
the environmental taxes will be raised 
proportionally to the decrease in the share 
of pollution-intensive industries and, 
vice versa, decrease even when GDP is 
growing on the condition that outdated 
technologies are being replaced by new, 
environmentally safe ones. It is true that 
such local deviations in the dynamics of 
tax revenues and GDP are possible but we 
can hardly consider it a realistic scenario 
that such deviations will persist for many 
years or even decades. Thus, the turnpike 
principle can be considered universally 
applicable despite some possible local de-
viations. This does not contradict the turn-
pike hypothesis but expands the scope of 
our analysis as we are now able to identify 
the periods when the turnpike principle 
is not fulfilled, which signifies a clash of 
interests of different economic agents, for 
example, business and the state. 
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